Mason, Charles F.Nowell, C.2024-02-082024-02-081992-04-01https://wyoscholar.uwyo.edu/handle/internal/1503https://doi.org/10.15786/wyoscholar/9617It is arguably true that no single topic has held more of a fascination for students of Industrial Organization than the issue of entry deterrence. This issue has been analyzed from many perspectives, including: role of advertising and imperfect information in deterring entry [1; 14; 18; 19]; incentives confronting a monopoly seller of durable goods [3; 4]; incentives in the context of sequential entry [2; 9]; dynamic aspects of entry deterrence [10; 13]; and the role of excess capacity in deterring entry [2; 23].enghttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/EconomicsEntry, Collusion, and Capacity Constraintsjournal contribution10.2307/1060235