


'Indians
SHALL DO THINGS
in common'

Oglala Lakota Identity
and Cattle-Raising on the
Pine Ridge Reservation

by JEFFREY D. MEANS



For the Oglala Lakota, cattle represented an opportunity to maintain traditional culture and create a subsistence economy while adapting to reservation life. During the early reservation years, the Oglala herded their cattle communally, and all animals were branded with the Pine Ridge brand, the flying O. However, different ideas about the reservation's economic future lead to inequities between full-bloods and mixed-bloods that created deep and lasting divisions within Oglala culture. Bad Heart Bull, an Oglala who from 1890 to 1913 depicted an earlier period of tribal life, drew this Oglala cowboy and a steer bearing the flying O brand.

Graphic based on Helen H. Blish et al., *A Pictographic History of the Oglala Sioux* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1967), 459

☰ In June 1889, a young man named Will S. Hughes gave this account of a beef issue to the Oglala Lakota at Pine Ridge Agency:

The boss farmer and his interpreter would enter the small house; at a command the cattle started thru the shute [*sic*] and the interpreter called the two names for each animal turned loose, until 500 long horned steers had been released. The big flat was covered with chasing, shooting Indians, until it sounded like a battle was taking place. After the firing had ceased Mr. Baredy took us out on the prairie where the slaughtering was being done. The first scene we witnessed was two squaws and two old men who were hurriedly ripping the hide from a big long horn. Four or 5 dusky children were eagerly watching the procedure. In fact it seemed that the 2 old "gals" were doing the work. As the hide came off, meat was cut off in pieces, the papooses eagerly picking up clotted blood from under foot, eating it with apparent relish. The old bucks secured a kidney each, and would cut off huge bites and chew like a Virginia planter would a hunk of tobacco. The whole thing was [a] bit sickening to a tenderfoot.¹

The turning loose of hundreds of steers for the tribe to hunt in a familiar, or "traditional," manner, seemingly barbarous to white witnesses, represents more than an interesting anecdote in western history.² During the early reservation period, between 1868 and 1889, the beef issue and the tribe's cattle herd represented an opportunity for the Oglala to continue their way of life as a self-sufficient and independent people while reaching an accommodation with the expansionist and capitalistic United States.

This period marked a time of unprecedented cultural change for the Oglala Lakota.³ In a series of

treaties and legislative acts, the Oglala lost increasingly larger segments of their territory to the United States. In exchange for this land, the tribe received food rations, monetary compensation, and livestock. With these resources, the Oglala hoped to create a subsistence economy centered on following cattle herds across the Great Sioux Reservation and harvesting them as they had the bison. The Oglala sought to maintain their cultural integrity by remaining mobile, mounted, armed, and economically self-sufficient.

Moreover, reservation land was to be owned in common, and cattle herds, much like the tribe's horse herds, could then roam the reservation under the watchful eye of the young men of the tribe. And like horses, cattle might be owned personally, by family groups called *tiospaye*, or tribally. This practice allowed those with larger personal herds to demonstrate their generosity by sharing their beef. Demonstrating generosity was a vital leadership characteristic that maintained social and political bonds of kinship and reciprocity. By providing resources and

The terms of the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie provided the Lakota with beef and flour rations in exchange for giving up claims to all land but the Great Sioux Reservation. To supply the meat, cattle were trailed to the reservation, and on the day of the beef issue, the Oglala harvested the animals in the same way as they had bison in pre-reservation days. At right, Oglala families focus on the hunters lined up in the background waiting for steers to be released for the chase at the Pine Ridge Agency circa 1890. Families would join their hunters to butcher and transport the beef.



an assurance of self-sufficiency, tribal leaders could maintain a significant level of political influence and gain tribal autonomy.⁴


Despite the newly fixed reservation boundaries, the Lakota possessed more than enough land to remain a well-fed and independent people. However, the Oglala faced many obstacles—including the American ideology of assimilation, the appearance on the reservation of white men who married Indian wives, and increased institutional controls—that stymied their attempts to create a tribal cattle herd and negotiate a new way of life.⁵ As the tribe struggled to re-create its economy, disparate ideas about the economic future of the reservation resulted in a full-blood–mixed-blood split and brought about divisions within Oglala culture that would stretch into the twenty-first century.⁶




U.S. assimilation policies concerning the incorporation of Indians into American society emerged

from decades, if not centuries, of Euro-American contact with indigenous tribes. By the turn of the nineteenth century, such American intellectuals as Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and John Adams believed Native Americans needed to be assimilated into white society in order to survive, and, ultimately, through miscegenation, to become white.⁷ Moreover, President Jefferson made yeoman farmers the foundation of an economic strategy based on the perceived contributions of farmers to the American ideals of democracy and independence. This rather idealistic perspective greatly influenced Indian policy over the next century and a half as the federal government used this economic and social model as the ideal structure for assimilating Indians. Later in the nineteenth century, well-intentioned reformers such as Richard Henry Pratt, who founded Carlisle Indian Industrial School for Indians in 1879, attempted to complete the transformation of Indians into American citizens. Pratt and his fellow reformers believed that “there was only one way for the Indians to survive the onslaught

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of progress: they would have to be swallowed up in the rushing tide of American life and institutions.”⁸ In other words, Native Americans might survive but only by forsaking their own culture for another.⁹

The United States’ efforts to transform Oglala culture during the early reservation years did not represent the tribe’s first experience with dramatic cultural change. Starting about 1690, the Oglala—one of seven tribes that make up the Lakota Nation—migrated west from Minnesota to the Black Hills and other parts of the northern plains.¹⁰ This move allowed them to take advantage of increased trading and hunting opportunities and to escape increasing pressure from the Anishinaabe. During this time, the Oglala adapted to a new environment and material culture by developing an economy based on bison hunting as well as establishing a new political structure. Unlike many neighboring plains agriculturists whose societies developed a strictly hierarchical organization, the Oglala formed a loose confederation of patriarchal-led family units called *tiospaye*.¹¹ The development of this loose confederation allowed the Lakota people greater flexibility and maneuverability in following the herds of bison, which, in turn, kept the tribe well fed.¹²

Although Oglala encountered cattle before the reservation period—predominantly those of settlers who crossed Lakota territory heading west—the ungulates

never represented more than targets of opportunity in raiding. By the 1860s, however, the enormous herds of bison that roamed the plains had shrunk significantly because of over-hunting, weather changes, and Anglo expansion. The dramatic reduction of the northern bison herd led the federal government to take steps to alleviate growing tribal unrest and head off possible conflicts. During 1865 treaty negotiations, the U.S. government promised to pay each individual Lakota “at the rate of about fifteen dollars per head per annum in view of the fact that the bison and other game, by means of which these nomadic tribes subsist, are being driven from the country by the whites who traverse it.” Through the treaty terms, the United States sought to engineer a new economy based on farming, stipulating that the Lakota not impede tribal members who wished to pursue agriculture. Moreover, twenty-five dollars per person would be paid to each Indian engaged in cultivation—ten dollars more than Indians otherwise inclined. The federal government also promised the Oglala that if one hundred lodges gathered in one area to take up agriculture the United States must provide an agency and employ a farmer for their instruction.¹³

Although no agreement was signed as a result of the 1865 negotiations, the new federal-Lakota relationship continued to evolve through legislation and treaties, including the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie.

mie, which established the Great Sioux Reservation. The reservation included all of what is now South Dakota west of the Missouri River, southwestern North Dakota, southeastern Montana, and a large part of northeastern Wyoming and northwestern Nebraska. According to the treaty provisions, the tribe maintained hunting rights within reservation boundaries and “the right to hunt on any lands north of the Platte, and on the Republican Fork of the Smoky Hill River, so long as the bison may range thereon.” The United States viewed all lands outside of present-day South Dakota as “unceded Indian Territory” that would eventually revert to American ownership.¹⁴

The Fort Laramie Treaty also included a provision for food rations. Each tribal member would receive one pound of cured beef and one pound of flour per

day. An indication of the severity of the food shortage caused by dwindling bison herds was Special U.S. Indian Agent J. P. Cooper’s request that all Indians north of the Platte River be sent immediately to Fort Randall for supplies. “The great danger now is that the scarcity of bison in that region will compel the Indians to commit depredations in order to live,” he noted. Even so, the federal government viewed the beef ration as a temporary measure to provide sustenance until the Lakota learned to farm and made no early attempts to supply the tribe with breeding stock for a tribal herd.¹⁵

Problems concerning the amount of beef issued to the tribe arose early. From September 30, 1867, to June 30, 1868, the federal government issued 145,551 pounds of beef to approximately six thousand Oglala and Sicangu (Brulé) Lakota, Northern Arapaho, and

Detail, John C. H. Grabill, photographer, Library of Congress, LC-DIG-ppmsc-02519



H. GRABILL. OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR. PHOTOGRAPH BY JOHN C. H. GRABILL. COURTESY OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION.

The federal government’s efforts to transform Oglala culture during the reservation years did not represent the tribe’s first experience with dramatic cultural change. In the first half of the eighteenth century, the seven Lakota tribes acquired horses and migrated west to the northern plains. One of these tribes, the Oglalas, formed a loose confederation of patriarchal-led family units called *tiospaye* that allowed flexibility in following the bison herds and maintained social and political bonds of kinship and reciprocity. During the reservation era, the *tiospaye* continued to serve as the tribe’s organizational structure. Above, a group of Lakotas posed on or near the Pine Ridge Reservation in 1891.



In this undated photograph, the hunter on the right holds his bow with an arrow nocked after making the kill with the arrow embedded in the steer's innards, seen to the right of the man butchering. The man on the far right is probably the government-appointed district farmer whose job was to teach the Oglala how to farm. Federal policymakers thought farming, not stock-raising, should be the mainstay of the reservation economy.

Northern Cheyenne around the Red Cloud Agency, or twenty-four pounds of beef per month for each tribal member. Even these numbers are deceptively optimistic. The beef issued to the tribe was counted in gross poundage, or what cattle weighed on the hoof. A butchered longhorn steer on average yielded approximately one-third of its total weight as edible meat. Further loss occurred through spoilage of slaughtered beef, which reduced processed beef by another 10 to 50 percent. Calculations using cattle delivered on the hoof also skewed the numbers. Cattle weighed upon arrival often lost hundreds of pounds if kept over the winter yet appeared on the rolls at full weight. Winterkill also counted as issued beef.¹⁶

Differing opinions emerged between the federal government and its Indian agents regarding how the Lakota should feed themselves. Distant federal policymakers rarely understood, or cared about, the environmental and economic realities faced by Indian agents charged with policy implementation, including establishing farms and herds. The fundamental

disagreement centered on the viability of farming in the region and the number of cattle needed to meet the government's ration responsibility. As early as 1870, the Red Cloud agent's annual report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs stated that "it will be understood that teaching the Indians the art of cultivating the soil is attended with many difficulties in this locality . . . on account of location of the lands allotted to them for agricultural purposes, which, owing to the frequency of droughts and visits of the grasshopper, make the failure to produce a crop nearly a certainty." In 1875, Agent J. J. Saville wrote in his report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that "If the Indians become self-supporting, it must be by the same pursuits that the white people engage in, viz, stock-raising."¹⁷

Beef issued to the tribe was also a contested matter since the federal government consistently provided far less beef than requested. In 1875, Agent Saville requested 14,782,500 pounds for the Oglala and Northern Cheyenne living around Red Cloud Agency.

To calculate beef requirements, Saville multiplied 548 pounds annual need per person by the population, 8,992, which came to 4,927,616 pounds. Assuming one-third yield per steer, he multiplied that number by 3 to arrive at 14,782,848, which he then apparently rounded down. The government contracted for only 9 million gross pounds, which provided, at best, 333 pounds of edible beef per person per year. This amount shrank precipitously with loss of animals after issue and meat spoilage figured in.¹⁸

A factor impossible to calculate but that greatly affected how much beef was actually issued to the tribe involved “the Indian Ring.” This term denotes the corruption that permeated the Office of Indian Affairs. One favorite trick of unscrupulous Indian agents who issued cattle entailed weighing one herd over and over again until the contracted weight was reached. The supplier and agent could then split the tremendous profit. The effect of a shortage of promised beef meant Indians often faced starving conditions, a situation not of great concern to those crooked officials involved.

It is not surprising that the Oglala hoped to create their own cattle herd, especially after 1870 when bison numbers dropped precipitously. Their intentions were clearly stated during an 1875 meeting to discuss relinquishing the Black Hills. The United States offered \$25,000 for tribal hunting rights in the region. The Oglala and Sicangu present demanded the equivalent to be paid in cattle, horses, harnesses, and wagons if the tribe could not keep the land. Chief Spotted Tail of the Sicangu stated: “I want to live on the interest of my money [received for the loss of the Black Hills]. . . . I will trade some of it for stock to raise cattle. . . . [W]e want some good cattle every year.” The U.S. government agreed to pay the Lakota “\$50,000 for ten years to be paid in good American cows and other livestock, and in such implements of husbandry as are convenient to stock-growing and as may be deemed advisable by the President.” Although the 1875 negotiations ultimately failed—leading to the “Sioux Wars of 1876” and the famous Battle of the Little Bighorn—

the tribe’s demand for cattle in the Black Hills negotiations reveals the central role the tribe intended cattle to play in its economy and its willingness to work toward that goal.¹⁹

In the aftermath of the Sioux Wars, under the threat of further military action, the Lakota agreed to the terms of the Black Hills Act of 1877, which formally removed the Black Hills from Lakota territory.²⁰ The loss of grazing land greatly diminished tribal resources, but the reservation herd grew nonetheless. By 1879, the Oglala owned 1,622 head of cattle,

Federal Beef Rations to the Oglala Lakota, 1879–85

Year	Tribal population	Gross pounds of beef issued	Net pounds of beef available per year	Net pounds of beef per person for each year
1879	7,000	7,522,807	2,482,526	178–355
1880	7,200	7,988,712	2,636,275	183–366
1881	7,500	8,753,332	2,888,599	193–385
1882	7,500	7,430,282	2,451,993	163–327
1883	7,800	8,280,262	2,732,487	175–350
1884	8,300	8,055,075	2,658,175	160–320
1885	7,649	7,941,438	2,620,675	172–343
Mean	7,564	7,916,028	2,638,676	175–350

Although the Lakota were promised a beef ration of one pound of cured beef per person per day, the amount of meat supplied by the federal government was often much less than that amount. All calculations were based upon the weight of the cattle when they arrived at the agency and did not take into account meat spoilage, loss of weight before butchering, or the effects of graft.

and Agent Valentine T. McGillicuddy predicted an excellent future for stock-raising, especially in view of the Department of the Interior’s issue of an additional 500 cows and heifers and 22 bulls. These cattle all possessed at least a quarter “American stock,” meaning Shorthorn, Hereford, or similar breeding.²¹ The addition of the “American cows” and the 100 cows the tribe managed to save from the summer beef issue brought total herd numbers to 2,500 by year’s end. Despite the dire predictions the cattle would be immediately butchered, Agent McGillicuddy found that the “Indians have almost invariably herded their cattle well, and have raised young stock in considerable numbers.”²²

During the early reservation years, the Oglala herded their cattle communally, and all animals were branded with the Pine Ridge brand, the flying O. Under the watch of Indian herders hired by the



One of the problems that would disrupt the Oglala's communal cattle-raising was the presence on the reservation of non-Indian men who had married Lakota women and thus by virtue of marriage gained access to the rights available to their wives as tribal members and to the children born of the marriage—including the yearly issue of cattle and grazing on reservation range lands. But because they embraced the market economy and assimilation policy, these “white husbands” and their families also had significant advantages over traditionalists, such as government-issued supplies and the freedom to make business decisions without the agent's interference. Antoine Janis (standing, right), an interpreter and army guide in the 1850s, married a young woman from the Red Cloud family. In 1858, he homesteaded in the Poudre Valley of Colorado, where he lived until 1878, when he returned with his wife and family to live on Pine Ridge. The identities of the others in the photograph and the date are uncertain.

agent, the cattle grazed the reservation's bison grass and blue grama grass, which not only produces highly nutritious summer forage but also excellent winter pasture.²³ During the winter months, the cattle were often provided with hay harvested by the tribe, but the animals also spread out over the vast expanse of the reservation, often intermixing with the white-owned herds that grazed the “open range.” Each spring the Oglala participated in a roundup with their off-reservation neighbors during which tens of thousands of cattle were gathered, sorted, and branded.

By the late 1870s, the problems that would disrupt

the Oglala's communal cattle-raising and haunt the Lakota well into the twentieth century had already become apparent. Agent McGillicuddy identified two in his 1879 report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The first was the emerging presence of “squaw men”—white men who married Lakota women.²⁴ These “white husbands” enjoyed the rights given to Indians in exchange for the loss of their lands—such as a yearly issue of cattle, access to grazing land, and exemption from paying taxes on animals—by virtue of marriage. Some of these men—including Antoine Janis and Batiste “Big Bat”

Pourier—came from Colorado following the example of their friend William McGaa, an Oglala mixed-blood. “Denver Bill,” as many called him, acquired his moniker because on March 8, 1859, he had been the first baby born in the newly incorporated city of Denver. Upon his father’s death in 1879, he and his mother, a full-blooded Oglala whose great-uncle was Chief Day, traveled to South Dakota to put down roots with her family on the reservation. Denver Bill had become the largest single cattle rancher on Pine Ridge by 1900.²⁵

Other “white husbands” arrived in the region as cowhands on the cattle drives from Kansas and Nebraska that brought government-issued steers to the Oglala, married Oglala women, and settled on the reservation. “White husbands” and their mixed-blood descendants, though never making up more than 20 percent of the tribal population during this period, came to control the emergent reservation cattle industry. One such “white husband” was Cornelius Augustus Craven. Craven, in fact, married Denver Bill’s mixed-blood sister, Jessie, and came to control the Open Buckle Ranch on Pine Ridge; the Bar D was one of the first individual family brands on the reservation.²⁶

Mixed-blood families like Craven’s understood and worked within market systems more willingly than full-bloods, which meant agents viewed them as “progressive” Indians who accepted assimilation policies and the concepts of capitalism, materialism, and individualism. They used personal brands to keep their cattle separate from the tribe’s and sought to sell cattle for profit rather than use the animals for sustenance. They possessed the freedom to make business decisions without the agent’s interference; by the late 1880s, these families were allowed to ship cattle to the stockyards in Omaha or Chicago. Agents also conferred favor “by providing greater access to government-issued supplies such as fence wire, nails, and posts.” In addition, Denver Bill McGaa and other “white husbands” often allowed off-reservation cattle outfits to graze cattle on reservation land for cash payoffs.²⁷

Agent McGillycuddy described both “white husbands” and trespassing problems when he noted:

The squaw-men assume that by marriage they have all the rights of full-blooded Indians, and they endeavor to exercise these rights not only in possession of cattle themselves, but also in ranging and pasturing upon Indian reservations large herds belonging to other white men; and when the removal of such cattle is attempted by the agent, the squaw-men claim property in them under fictitious bills of sale.



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Oglala mixed-blood William McGaa, the first baby born in Denver, returned to the Great Sioux Reservation with his mother in 1879. By 1900, “Denver Bill” had become the largest single cattle rancher on Pine Ridge. His mixed-blood sister, Jessie, married Cornelius Craven, who came to control the Open Buckle Ranch on Pine Ridge; the Bar D was one of the first individual family brands used on the reservation.



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
Batiste “Big Bat” Pourier (above, with his wife, Josephine Richards, circa 1920) worked in the West as a freighter and interpreter. He married the youngest daughter of fellow Frenchman and frontiersman John Richards and his Lakota wife, Mary, in 1869.

Trespassing on tribal lands reached unprecedented levels by 1884 when between seventy thousand and eighty thousand head of cattle illegally grazed on the Lakota reservation. Such individualistic economic behavior ran counter to an Oglala economy founded on kinship relationships and communal ideals. Traditionalist Oglala families who sought to maintain long-standing socioeconomic structures based on kinship and community found themselves cut off from such support. In Lakota culture, if a man accumulated personal wealth for its own sake it represented bad manners and demonstrated the serious character flaw of selfishness. This shortcoming meant never holding a leadership position or gaining the respect of his family or band because he placed his own needs over the tribe's.²⁸

Despite significant challenges, the Lakota contin-

ued to focus resources on a subsistence economy.²⁹ In his 1880 report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Agent McGillicuddy noted tribal cattle numbers had risen to 3,500 because of a summer beef issue of 1,000 head.³⁰ McGillicuddy also noted in June 1880 that the tribe's care of the stock issued was quite good, and "in fact, these Indians taking naturally, as they do, to stock-raising and herding, this would seem to offer the most feasible and practical method of making them eventually self-supporting." At that time, McGillicuddy believed reservation farming was unrealistic.³¹

By 1883, approximately 7,800 Oglala lived in the region around Pine Ridge Agency, most along scattered creek bottoms and some as far as forty miles away. By then, perhaps 5 to 10 percent were "white husbands" or mixed-bloods. Tribal cattle numbers



Helen H. Blish et al., *A Pictographic History of the Oglala Sioux* (Lincoln, Neb.: 1967), 457

In 1875, when the Lakota discussed relinquishing the Black Hills, the U.S. government promised to pay "\$50,000 for ten years to be paid in good American cows and other livestock . . . convenient to stock-growing." That the Lakota requested cattle shows the role they hoped cattle would play in the reservation's economy. The Oglala's share of these animals plus the 100 cows saved from the summer beef issue brought the tribe's herd to 2,500 by the end of 1879. By 1889, it had grown to 5,500 head. Amos Bad Heart Bull drew this illustration of a cattle roundup. His title translated from Lakota is "The Oglalas had a big job cutting out cattle."



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Between 1880 and 1886, non-Indian stockgrowers brought hundreds of thousands of cattle into the region to graze on the now federally owned land surrounding the Great Sioux Reservation, and sometimes on the reservation itself.

Each spring, the Oglala participated in a roundup with their off-reservation neighbors during which cattle were gathered, sorted, and branded. These annual roundups continued well after the end of the open-range cattle industry.

Above, a mixed group of cowboys relax with a meal during a Pine Ridge roundup circa 1900.

had climbed to 5,500, yet the issue of beef rations continued to concern Agent McGillicuddy. He believed that although most stockmen on the reservation provided good care for their animals, some “traditionalists” neglected their cattle or ate them because they counted on the yearly beef issue for sustenance. Others sold their issued cattle, usually five animals, to whites or “white husbands” in order to make enough money to survive. Agent McGillicuddy alluded to this point when in 1884 he stated stock-raising went as “well as could be expected, many of the better class of Indians now owning respectable sized herds, breaking in steers for work purposes, and occasionally selling the increase to neighboring settlers, when in the opinion of the agent the same is advisable.” Those who ran larger herds cooperated with ranchers in Nebraska and the Black Hills area in gathering and returning winter strays, which McGillicuddy noted as a welcome change from the practice of stealing one another’s stock whenever possible.³²

As control over the reservation cattle industry shifted, full-bloods found it increasingly difficult to

accumulate herds large enough to sustain a breeding population. The Bureau of Indian Affairs reacted by tightening regulations. In an 1884 letter to Agent McGillicuddy, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Hiram Price instructed the agent to put an end to the selling of government-issued and surplus cattle. “[Y]our Indian police should be on the alert to prevent the sale of these stock cattle, unless when the sale is made with your full knowledge and consent,” Price wrote. The paternalism inherent in assimilationist policy meant that Indian agents, not tribal members, decided who could sell beef at market or on the reservation. A white husband and his mixed-blood children more often than not enjoyed the agent’s support in all business transactions. The reverse held true for traditionalists who did not fully support assimilationist policies.³³

At the same time, federal policymakers continued to believe that farming would be the salvation of the Lakota. Even Agent McGillicuddy, who had previously rejected the idea of reservation farming, urged an end to the beef rations and an increased focus on

large-scale farming projects in 1885.³⁴ With an average rainfall of less than 20 inches, the region was not suited for large-scale farming, but the occasional success—such as the over twenty-one thousand bushels of corn and six thousand bushels of potatoes the tribe raised thanks to an abundance of rain in 1888—only encouraged the unrealistic hopes for dryfarming. Later agents' reports noted droughts, grasshoppers, and fires as major causes of crop failure. Nonetheless, horticultural efforts and various failed projects (including the Eagle's Nest irrigation project) continued on the Pine Ridge Reservation throughout the twentieth century.³⁵

Even as the federal government was urging the Oglala to become farmers, western Nebraska and the Dakotas saw a huge increase in cattle numbers as off-reservation stockmen maximized herd size to increase profits. As a result, between 1880 and 1886, the region experienced massive overgrazing. This overgrazing, coupled with a dry summer and a severe winter in 1886–87, left as many as three-quarters of the area's outfits “to the wall with a seventy-five to hundred percent ‘kill’ of their range stock.” Typically, the cattle outfits surrounding the reservation—the Sheidley Cattle Company's Flying V, run by G. E.

“Ed” Lemon, and the Holcomb family's HO and OHO outfit—gathered anywhere from ten thousand to seventy-five thousand cattle each spring. During the spring 1887 roundup, the outfits gathered only three thousand head. By comparison, the Oglala cattle fared remarkably well because of the reservation practice of providing winter hay. Agent H. D. Gallagher reported the number of tribally owned stock increased from 4,927 in 1885 to 6,278 in 1887.³⁶

The year 1887 had far-reaching effects on the Ogalalas in other ways. In 1887, Congress passed the Dawes Act, which gave the president the power to force Indians to accept allotment of their reservations. Allotment would give Indian heads of household 160 acres of land to be held in trust for twenty-five years, which meant they would incur no taxes and would not be able to sell the land. It was hoped that private ownership of homesteads would create a sense of individualism and self-sufficiency among Indians, speed up the assimilation process, and create productive American citizens—citizenship being part of the process.

Although the Oglala managed to stave off allotment until 1904, they and the entire Lakota Nation felt the effects of the Dawes Act almost immediately



Valentine T. McGillicuddy served as the Indian agent on the Pine Ridge Reservation between 1879 and 1886. As the agent, he played an important role in implementing federal assimilation policies. Doubtful about the possibilities for farming for much of his time on the reservation, McGillicuddy in June 1880 wrote that stock-raising and herding “would seem to offer the most feasible and practical method of making them eventually self-supporting.” McGillicuddy is pictured here (center) in 1883 with (from left) Pine Ridge Indian policemen Standing Soldier and George Sword; interpreter William Garnett; and Young Man Afraid of His Horses.

Nebraska State Historical Society, Lincoln, RG2845 PH 3-4

since it led directly to the Sioux Bill of 1889, which reduced the Great Sioux Reservation by 9 million acres.³⁷ It also separated the seven tribes of Lakota onto six new reservations in western South Dakota: Standing Rock, Cheyenne River, Crow Creek, Lower Brule, Rosebud, and Pine Ridge. The Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, created for the Oglala, encompassed 3,155,200 acres. For the ceded land, the entire Lakota nation received a twenty-year extension of the educational provisions of the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, thirty new day schools, farm equipment, \$1 million from the sale of ceded land, and at the tribe's insistence, 25,000 head of stock cows and 1,000 bulls.³⁸ The Oglalas' share of stock came to 7,520 cows and 300 bulls.³⁹

The request for large numbers of cattle indicates the vital role the Lakota still hoped cattle would play in their economic future. These hopes are illustrated in a letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs from Chief Lip, a Sicangu leader from the Rosebud Reservation, who demanded to be counted among the Oglala because they more closely mirrored his own belief that the Lakota should keep their pre-reservation culture. In his letter (which he traveled a considerable distance to ask the agent to transcribe), Chief Lip emphasized his desire to see land held in common (a phrase he used and underlined three times), saying: "My friends, you who care for the Indians we want to do in this way and let you know. The agreement of 1889 says that Indians shall do things *in common* raising stock cattle. This is a solemn agreement, it was that those who lived at the Bad Lands to raise cattle, sheep, and horses should have the land *in common*."⁴⁰

The year 1889 marked a significant turning point for the Oglala in several ways. The first was a change to federal policy regarding the beef ration. Between 1885 and 1889, the federal government had reduced the annual beef rations from 8 million to 4 million pounds, a reduction that occurred in response to a sharp reduction in the tribal census. Agent McGillycuddy's census in 1885 counted 7,649 Indians on the

reservation. The following year, a new agent, Captain J. M. Bell, undertook a far more rigorous census in the name of cost cutting and found only 4,873 Indians. The Indians "acknowledge they had been drawing rations for all their ghosts," and the reduction might save the government fifty thousand dollars a year in beef rations alone, Agent Bell stated.⁴¹

The reduction in beef rations meant a dramatic cutback of a significant tribal resource, and it hindered



Federal policymakers continued to believe that farming would be the salvation of the Lakota. Despite the droughts, grasshoppers, and fires that caused repeated crop failures, horticultural efforts continued throughout the twentieth century. The only successes came out of small, hand-irrigated fields, such as those at the Oglala Boarding School (above, 1913).

the tribe's ability to enlarge its herd. In 1889, the number of tribally owned cattle stood at 10,968 head; by 1891, despite the stock provided by the 1889 Sioux Bill, it had dropped to 7,982 because the Oglala had slaughtered animals for food. In 1890 alone, the tribe ate 700,000 pounds of their stock to make it through the winter. Moreover, the traditionalist majority was the segment of the Oglala population most dependent upon beef rations and thus the effects of the reduction disproportionately hurt them.⁴²

The other draconian regulations also came into effect in 1889 as the traditional hunting methods that had been used to slaughter issued beef for more than twenty years came under scrutiny. Local and federal officials had never approved of this butchering method because of its perceived "savagery," which they felt hindered progress toward civilization. As early as 1874, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs asked Agent

Central Classified Files, 1907-39, RG 75, box 46, folder 00-1913, National Archives



The passage of the Sioux Bill of 1889 reduced the Great Sioux Reservation by 9 million acres and scattered the tribes among various smaller reservations, including the Oglala on Pine Ridge. Under the terms of the bill, rations increased to one and a half pounds of beef per Indian per day. The Oglala continued to slaughter this beef through traditional hunting methods—a practice that officials perceived as a hindrance in progress toward “civilization”—until it was outlawed by new federal regulations. This sequence of photographs illustrates how the Oglala “hunted” cattle. Above, top, men wait for their names to be called by the Pine Ridge Reservation “boss farmer” in the “small house” in this detail of an 1891 photograph. The “boss” released the cattle through a chute next to the house. When called, the hunters urged their horses in pursuit of the steers, which they chased and shot (center). After the shooting stopped, the families brought the wagons and help skin and cut the beef (bottom).





Another new regulation handed down at the same time as that banning the cattle "hunt" stipulated that all calves receive individual brands rather than the tribal brand. This exacerbated the split between traditionalists and those "white husbands" and mixed-bloods who had embraced the market economy. By 1897, the number of Indian stock had risen to 40,051 head, an increase of more than 500 percent in seven years. While this increase in cattle numbers helped some to achieve economic independence, the majority of the Oglala failed to reap the benefits. At this time, approximately 80 percent of Indians on Pine Ridge survived entirely on government annuities and rations. Right, top, women gathered at Pine Ridge Agency to receive rations in 1891. Right, below, women hang meat to dry in November 1908.

J. J. Saville if a more efficient method to dispatch the animals could be found. In 1889, the Department of the Interior announced new regulations pertaining to the handling and harvesting of tribal cattle: no cattle could be killed without the agent's permission; no stock issued for breeding could be killed; cows or heifers could not be killed unless proven barren; and no permits would be issued to kill steers less than three years old. Once the agent possessed the power to decide when or if cattle could be slaughtered, he also held the power to decide the method. Not coincidentally, the "hunts" ended shortly after the new policy was implemented. Moreover, new regulations about the handling of cattle during the annual spring roundup—held in coordination with off-reservation cattle outfits—stipulated that all calves receive individual brands rather than the tribal brand.⁴³

These rules promoted the domination of the reservation cattle industry by "white husbands" and mixed-bloods. If full-bloods were not allowed to butcher and eat their cattle, selling the animals for cash was their only option. By forcing individuals to segregate their property, the federal government sought to instill individualism and material accumulation as dominant economic motivations. This alienated the Oglala who favored communalism—the vast majority—from those who embraced the market economy.

The long-term effects of the beef issue reduction, the full-blood-mixed-blood economic divisions, and increased institutional controls became more evident as the decades unfolded. When in 1893 the federal government sought to purchase "American breeding cows of good quality" to fulfill the terms of the Sioux Bill of 1889, it was the "sufficiently progressive and



intelligent" Indians who received the Oglala's share. By 1897, the number of Indian stock had risen to 40,051 head, an increase of more than 500 percent in seven years. Moreover, by 1898, the "white husbands" and mixed-bloods had joined together to form a stock association to protect brands, kill wolves, and work together for one another's *individual* benefit. While the increase in cattle numbers and improved operational efficiency helped some to achieve economic independence, the majority of the Oglala failed to reap the benefits. At this time, approximately 80 percent of Indians on Pine Ridge survived entirely on government annuities and rations. The 20 percent that gained either complete or partial economic self-sufficiency were comprised of "white husbands," their mixed-blood children, and some few full-blood Oglala such as George Sword.⁴⁴

This cultural division moved more pointedly into the political arena during Franklin D. Roosevelt's



The cultural division on the reservation moved more pointedly into the political arena during Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal and the debate over the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) championed by Commissioner John Collier (shown, left foreground, being honored with the gift of a pipe in 1934 at Pine Ridge). The IRA brought the "old dealers" (traditionalist) and "new dealers" (mixed-bloods) into a struggle for control of reservation politics and resources. Echoes of this fight reappeared during the "Oglala Civil War" of the 1970s.



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New Deal and the much-debated Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) championed by Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier. While the IRA ended allotment and attacks on native culture, the legislation was also extremely paternalistic and rigid in structure. On the Pine Ridge Reservation, it brought the full-blood-mixed-blood factionalism into tribal politics as the "old dealers" (traditionalist) and "new dealers" (mixed-bloods) vied for control of reservation politics and resources. The "new dealers" prevailed, and a newly constituted Oglala government was created.⁴⁵ The new Oglala Tribal Council at times faced strong opposition from the more traditionally structured Treaty Council, which formed in 1889 and survives unchanged even today.


The political and cultural division on Pine Ridge reached an unfortunate and violent peak during the early 1970s in the "Oglala Civil War." Those involved included the Oglala Tribal Council—under the leadership of tribal chairman Dick Wilson and his Guardians of the Oglala Nation (better known as the GOON squad)—and the members of the American Indian Movement (AIM), an aggressive national organization that fought for Native American rights. The "Oglala Civil War" was the armed conflict that followed the famous 1973 AIM occupation of Wounded Knee battlefield. The seventy-one-day standoff with federal authorities provided energy and direction to the long marginalized full-blood Oglalas. The resulting clash of "new dealer" Dick Wilson's faction and AIM led

to the deaths of over seventy tribal members, mostly at the hands of the GOON squad.⁴⁶

While the violence of the "Oglala Civil War" ended by the late 1970s, the cultural divisions it represented still dominate Pine Ridge reservation politics today.⁴⁷ Although the terms "full-blood" and "mixed-blood" have evolved, in today's vernacular, "full-blood" is most often associated with anyone who, regardless of their actual blood quanta, seeks the tribe's betterment and not their own.⁴⁸ "Mixed-blood" also possesses many connotations, but it often denotes a "sellout," or someone who promotes American values over Lakota in some aspect of their life.

In 1868, the Oglala lived in a world rife with possibilities. The tribe had just defeated the United States in Red Cloud's War and signed a treaty that seemed to guarantee their future. As bison numbers dropped, they turned to cattle as a natural replacement for bison. Ultimately, however, the Oglala Lakota's goal of creating a self-sustaining pastoral society centered on cattle proved illusory. Federal assimilation policy coupled with antithetical worldviews on the Pine Ridge Reservation proved to be insurmountable obstacles.

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Above, Bad Heart Bull depicted Indian cowboys working side by side, one favoring traditional dress and the other clad in Anglo cowboy apparel.



For the Oglala, cattle-raising never fulfilled its economic or societal promise. The Oglala persisted in their efforts to create a subsistence economy that incorporated aspects of both native and American cultures, but federal assimilation policy and the rift between full-blood and mixed-blood populations on the Pine Ridge Reservation proved insurmountable. At left is an image of the 1887 photograph titled "Round-up Scenes on Belle Fouché."

Notes

'Indians shall do things in common'

1. Bert L. Hall, *Roundup Years, Old Muddy to Black Hills* (Pierre, S.Dak., 1956), 172.

2. Historian Robert Utley found the Oglala practice of hunting steers a "pathetic" attempt to "preserve a faint taste of the hunt." See *The Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890* (Albuquerque, N.M., 1984), 237.

3. This article uses "Lakota" instead of the historical "Sioux" unless referring directly to a specific treaty, reservation, or act of law. Lakota means "Alliance of Friends" and is the correct name for the tribal group previously known as the Teton Sioux. As for the name "Sioux," Frank T. Siebert Jr. records its origin as deriving from the Ojibwa word *Nadaues-sioux*, which denotes possessing both the qualities of a "lesser barbarian" and the small rattlesnake species *Massasauga*. Thus, "Sioux" is a pejorative slang term for "barbaric little snake in the grass." However, "Sioux" has become so common in American history and culture that many Lakota today refer to themselves as Sioux. See "Proto-Algonquian *na:tawe:wa 'massasauga': Some False Etymologies and Alleged Iroquoian Loanwords," *Anthropological Linguistics*, 38 (Winter 1996), 635-42.

4. For examinations of Oglala socio-political structure and development during the early reservation era, see Catherine Price, "Lakotas and Euroamericans: Contrasted Concepts of 'Chieftainship' and Decision Making Authority," *Ethnohistory*, 41 (Summer 1994), 447-63; and Catherine Price, *The Oglala People, 1841-1879: A Political History* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1996).

5. The discourse pertaining to Native American economic adaptation has evolved significantly over the last thirty years. In *Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1983), Richard White provided his "dependency theory," which stated that Indian economic dependency upon the federal government stemmed from native cultures' introduction to the market economy and the resulting commodification of land, labor, and tribal resources. This work presented a foundational theory and context for future studies concerning indigenous political economies. However, later historians found more complexity within the intercultural exchanges between Native

Americans and Euro-Americans. For example, Brian Hosmer, in *American Indians in the Marketplace: Persistence and Innovation among the Menominees and Metlaktlans, 1870-1920* (Lawrence, Kans., 1999), found within these tribes a dynamic ability to adapt to a changing market economy without losing their cultural identity. In *Neither Wolf nor Dog: American Indians, Environment, and Agrarian Change* (Oxford, U.K., 1994), David Rich Lewis noted cultural adaptability for the Northern Ute, the Hupa, and the Tohono O'odham in the face of an encroaching market economy but also that these tribes found themselves severely restricted economically by the same factors that hindered the Oglala. See also Gary Clayton Anderson, *Kinsmen of Another Kind: Dakota-White Relations in the Upper Mississippi Valley, 1650-1862* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1984); Alice Littlefield and Martha C. Knack, eds., *Native Americans and Wage Labor: Ethnohistorical Perspectives* (Norman, Okla., 1996); and John H. Moore, "Kinship and Division of Labor in Cheyenne Society," in *Marxist Approaches in Economic Anthropology: Monographs in Economic Anthropology, No. 9*, ed. Alice Littlefield and Hill Gates (New York, 1991). In particular, Peter Iverson's work *When Indians Became Cowboys: Native Peoples and Cattle Ranching in the American West* (Norman, Okla., 1994) looked at how Native Americans used cattle ranching as a strategy to confront changing times in an attempt to redefine themselves as a culture while maintaining tribal identity and individual self-esteem. Iverson found that "cattle ranching emerged, therefore, as a symbol of a new day" (p. 14).

Further studies looked at the Lakota specifically. Catherine Price, in *The Oglala People*, for example, shows that during the Oglala's westward migration their economic and political power became more diffuse as their population spread across the increasingly vast and ecologically open landscape. Confinement on a reservation significantly altered geographical relationships and concepts regarding political and economic power. In *Organizing the Lakota: The Political Economy of the New Deal on the Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservations* (Tucson, Ariz., 1992), Thomas Biolsi examines the political economy of the Brulé Lakota on Rosebud Reservation during the New Deal. He presents a thesis of rapid tribal resignation to Office of Indian Affairs control because of economic impotence

of reservation Indians and increased technologies of control. Such assessments minimize or ignore the Oglala's understanding and foresight regarding their future reservation existence and their persistence in striving for their economic and political goals.

For the Oglala, cattle-raising never fulfilled its economic or societal promise. In his article "The Evolution of Indian Leadership on the Great Plains, 1750-1950," *American Indian Quarterly*, 10 (Winter 1986), 65-82, Ernest Schusky found that Indians developed a more sophisticated leadership based on intimate knowledge of American culture at the turn of the twentieth century and that the essential division between those in political power and those without was individual economic independence on the reservations. He depicts control of cattle herds as key, yet he wonders why the creation of tribal herds failed so quickly.

6. Questions about Native American identity in general and the full-blood-mixed-blood dichotomy in particular have long been of interest to scholars. A number of studies have examined the meaning of the terms "full-blood" and "mixed-blood" within native cultures, either as economic indicators or as symbols latent with political meaning. Historian David Rich Lewis in his study of the Ute leader Na-am-quitch utilized most of the available anthropological theoretical frameworks to examine the "progressive-traditional" dichotomy. Lewis's work demonstrated that individual behavior and identity could not be predicated on blood quantum or cultural labels and that studies predicated on these divisions ignored the complexities of reservation life. See David Rich Lewis, "Reservation Leadership and the Progressive-Traditional Dichotomy: William Wash and the Northern Utes, 1865-1928," *Ethnohistory*, 38 (Spring 1991), 124-48. Loretta Fowler, looking at Arapaho culture, viewed the terms "full-blood" and "mixed-blood" as cultural symbols within native cultures that possessed varied tribal connotations yet are universally important within a political context. For the Arapaho, these terms meant little, as they adopted a "tribal" identity based on socioeconomic symbols such as generosity that both shaped and controlled acceptable political behavior. See Loretta Fowler, "Wind River Reservation Political Process: An Analysis of the Symbols of Consensus," *American Ethnologist*, 5 (Nov. 1978), 748-69.

Anthropologist Thomas Biolsi ventured beyond the tribal study in his examination of the full-blood-mixed-blood relationship within the broader discourse of colonization and identity. Building on the works of Michael Foucault, Erving Goffman, and others, Biolsi argued that the hegemonic institutional controls of the federal government re-created Lakota individual self-interests to mirror American society. Thus, the Lakota were subjugated when they adopted American definitions for "mixed-blood" (positive) and "full-blood" (negative). Thomas Biolsi, "The Birth of the Reservation: Making the Modern Individual among the Lakota," *American Ethnologist*, 22 (Feb. 1995), 28-53. For another tribal study grounded within the anthropological discourse of hegemony and colonization, see Gregory R. Campbell's "The Lemhi Shoshoni: Ethnogenesis, Sociological Transformations, and the Construction of a Tribal Nation," *American Indian Quarterly*, 25 (Autumn 2001), 539-78.

For a broader examination of blood reckoning as a tool of colonial hegemony, see Pauline Turner Strong and Barrick Van Winkle, "Indian Blood": Reflecting on the Reckoning and Refiguring of Native North American Identity," *Cultural Anthropologist*, 11 (Nov. 1996), 547-76.

7. Bernard Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian* (New York, 1974).

8. David Wallace Adams, *Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875-1928* (Lawrence, Kans., 1995), 39.

9. In *A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1984), Frederick Hoxie proposes that a fundamental shift in American concepts of assimilation after 1880. He found a change from the desire for complete assimilation and eventual homogenizing of races to a new concept of coexistence of diverse races, with Indians occupying a fixed place on the bottom of the new social scale and on the periphery of American civilization.

10. According to their origin story, the Lakota came from beneath the Black Hills.

11. *Tiospaye* are "defined as flexible exogamous residential units organized around a core of bilaterally related kin." See Paul M. Robertson, *The Power of the Land: Identity, Ethnicity, and Class among the Oglala, Sioux* (New York, 2002), 4. For a more detailed examination of Lakota economic structure, see Anderson, *Kinsmen of Another Kind*, 58-76.

12. The egalitarian nature of Oglala leadership coupled with the rise in power of war chiefs during the tribe's westward

expansion sometimes led to intratribal conflict. One of the most famous examples is the years-long rift within Oglala society resulting from the killing of Chief Bull Bear. See Jeffrey Ostler, *The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee* (Cambridge, U.K., 2004), 30; and Robert Larson, *Red Cloud: Warrior-Statesman of the Lakota Sioux* (Norman, Okla., 1997). It is important that this tribal division arose from breaks in kinship relationships revealed through political rivalry. The tribal factionalism that emerged in the early reservation era arose from the vastly different economic motivations and worldviews.

13. *Report of CIA* (hereafter *Report of CIA*), 39th Cong., 2nd sess., 1866-67, serial 1284 (Washington, D.C., 1867), 5.

14. George P. Sanger, *Statutes at Large, Treaties and Proclamations of the United States of America from . . .* (Boston, 1868), 639.

15. *Ibid.*: *Report of CIA*, 40th Cong., 3rd sess., 1868-69, serial 1366 (Washington, D.C., 1869), 711.

16. *Ibid.*, 709; Commissioner of Indian Affairs (hereafter CIA) Walker to Red Cloud Agent, Nov. 11, 1872, General Records, "Correspondence received from the Office of Indian Affairs, Indian warehouses & special agents, chronological arrangement, Feb. 24, 1871-Dec. 3, 1877" (hereafter "Correspondence received OIA, 1871-77"), box 2, Record Group 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (hereafter RG 75), Kansas City-National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter KC-NARA). This letter notes that the timing could mean thinner cattle because of the long drive. See also CIA E. P. Smith to J. J. Saville, Feb. 13, 1874, General Records, "Correspondence received OIA, 1871-77," box 2, RG 75, KC-NARA, which orders the agent to accept no cattle under 1,050 pounds. Despite this order, three years later the CIA asked the Red Cloud agent why 199 steers that averaged only 805 pounds were accepted below contract weight. See CIA E. P. Smith to Lieutenant C.A. Johnson, Jan. 24, 1877, General Records, "Correspondence received OIA, 1871-77," box 2, RG 75, KC-NARA; and CIA E. P. Smith to James Irwin, July 30, 1877, *ibid.*, which states that the agent must keep the cattle for twelve hours without food or water before being weighed to prevent excess weight being paid for by the government, which alludes to the common practice of "stuffing" cattle before being weighed for sale by cattlemen. This practice was not confined to reservation deliveries. See Robertson, *The Power of the Land*, 82-85.

17. *Report of CIA*, 41st Cong., 3rd sess., 1870-71, serial 1449 (Washington, D.C., 1871), 685; *Report of CIA*, 44th Cong., 1st

sess., 1875-76, serial 1680 (Washington, D.C., 1876), 753.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, 690-93.

20. *The Statutes at Large of the United States of America, from December, 1875, to March 1877 . . .*, vol. 19 (Washington, D.C., 1877), 255. Federal representatives ignored Article XII of the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie by not obtaining three-fourths of adult male signatures for its ratification.

21. While these "American stock" cattle did not arrive in the area until 1882, the Lakota's knowledge of breeds other than Texas longhorns demonstrates an awareness of cattle and their potential. For a look at early cattle businesses in the region, see Bob Lee and Dick Williams, *Last Grass Frontier: The South Dakota Stock Grower Heritage* (Rapid City, S.Dak., 1964); and Harry V. Johnston, *My Home on the Range: Frontier Life in the Bad Lands* (Saint Paul, Minn., 1942).

22. *Report of CIA*, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., 1879-80, serial 1910 (Washington, D.C., 1880), 75, 104, 145, 355.

23. W. A. Wheeler and D. D. Hill, *Grassland Seeds . . .* (New York, 1957), 562, 579-80.

24. Since the term "squaw man" is extremely offensive, I will substitute the term "white husband" in its place.

25. Hazel L. Cuney's *Ancestor Chart*, p. 3. McGaa, William, Biography M1312, Western History Collections, Denver Public Library (hereafter DPL); Scions of Denver McGaa, Early-Day Resident Here, Now Leaders Among Sioux," Apr. 29, 1925, Biography M, McGaa, William, and Family, Clipping Files, DPL; "Lovie McGaa, 100: The Memories Are Clear," Feb. 16, 1984, *Rapid City (S. D.) Journal*, *ibid.*; "Denver's First White Baby," Mar. 17, 1901, *Omaha World-Herald*, *ibid.* William McGaa is also a notable character in Elliot West's *The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado* (Lawrence, Kans., 1998), 184-85, 185-201.

26. M1312, pp. 4-13 (Letter and Report on C. A. Craven), Biography M, McGaa, William, and Family, Clipping Files, DPL.

27. John Brennan to George C. Dawson, Aug. 2, 1904, "Letters to Farmers & Employees" from Apr. 9, 1904 to Oct. 1906, vol. 4, Administrative Records, RG 75, KC-NARA.

28. *Report of CIA* (1879-80), serial 1910, 75, 104, 145, 355; Herbert Schell, *History of South Dakota* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1968), 243-47.

29. For most precapitalistic cultures, subsistence, not accumulation of excess, was the driving force of economic endeavors. See James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New

Haven, Conn., 1976); and Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley, Calif., 1982).

30. It is unclear what percentage of the herd fell under mixed-blood ownership since McGillicuddy provided only total herd size in his reports.

31. *Report of CIA*, 46th Cong., 3rd sess., 1880–81, serial 1959 (Washington, D.C., 1881), 162.

32. *Report of CIA*, 48th Cong., 1st sess., 1883–84, serial 2191 (Washington, D.C., 1884), 92–93, 346–347; *Report of CIA*, 48th Cong., 2nd sess., 1884–85, serial 2287 (Washington, D.C., 1885), 81–82.

33. Acting CIA A. Blipshaw to Hugh D. Gallagher, Oct. 18, 1886, General Records, “Correspondence received from the Office of Indian Affairs, Indian warehouses & special agents, chronological arrangement, May 4, 1886–Oct. 10, 1888 (hereafter “Correspondence received from the OIA, 1886–88”), box 8, RG 75, KC-NARA; Commissioner Price to Agent V. T. McGillicuddy, Mar. 5, 1884, General Records, “Correspondence received from the Office of Indian Affairs, Indian warehouses & special agents, chronological arrangement, Jan. 2, 1884–Apr. 22, 1886 (hereafter “Correspondence received from the OIA, 1884–88”), box 7, RG 75, KC-NARA.

34. *Report of CIA*, 49th Cong., 1st sess., 1885–86, serial 2379 (Washington, D.C., 1886), 261–64, 596–97. McGillicuddy cited the decrease in the number of cattle from the previous year’s total, from 5,500 to 4,927 head, and the fact that Red Cloud’s full-blood band killed and ate their issue of stock cattle as evidence of the need to end the beef ration.

35. *Ibid.* However, farming efforts in smaller, hand-irrigated fields, such as at the Oglala Boarding School, achieved some success in the late nineteenth century.

36. Hall, *Roundup Years*, 276; Lee, *Last Grass Frontier*, 63–64; Hall, *Roundup Years*, 278; *Report of CIA*, 50th Cong., 1st sess., 1887–88, serial 2542, (Washington, D.C., 1889), 464–65.

37. White cattlemen in the surrounding area strongly supported, if not actually led, the effort to reduce the Great Sioux Reservation since they would benefit from the increase in grazing land. Schell, *History of South Dakota*, 247.

38. *Report of CIA*, 50th Cong., 2nd sess., 1888–89, serial 2637 (Washington, D.C., 1889), LXXIII.

39. CIA D. Browning to Captain Penney, Mar. 13, 1895, General Records, box 17, RG 75, KC-NARA. The agent reported that during winter 1888 and spring 1889, white ranchers drove large numbers of cattle onto the reservation in order to obtain free grazing and avoid

taxes. When the agent wrote letters to all offending parties requesting that they remove their stock by July 1, most complied, but some small operators ignored the agent’s requests. *Report of CIA* (1888–89), LXXIII.

40. Chief Lip to CIA, Mar. 5, 1903, Special Cases, 1821–1907, SC-191, box 358, General Records, RG 75, KC-NARA.

41. *Report of CIA*, 49th Cong., 1st sess., 1885–86, serial 2379 (Washington, D.C., 1886), 262; *Report of CIA*, 50th Cong., 2nd sess., 1888–89, serial 2637 (Washington, D.C., 1889), 470–71; *Report of CIA* (1885–86), serial 2379, 259; *Report of CIA*, 49th Cong., 2nd sess., 1886–87, serial 2467 (Washington, D.C., 1887), 294.

42. *Report of CIA*, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1889–90, serial 2725 (Washington, D.C., 1890), 156; Robertson, *The Power of the Land*, 56; *Report of CIA*, 51st Cong., 2nd sess., 1890–91, serial 2841 (Washington, D.C., 1891), 50.

43. Commissioner E. P. Smith to Agent Saville, Apr. 9, 1874, General Records, box 2, RG 75, KC-NARA; *Report of CIA*, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1889–90, serial 2725 (Washington, D.C., 1890), 156.

44. CIA D. M. Browning to Charles G. Penney, Dec. 1, 1893, General Records, Subject Arrangement: Finance, Jan. 6, 1891–Mar. 28, 1895, box 17, RG 75, KC-NARA; *Report of CIA*, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., 1897–98, serial 3641 (Washington, D.C., 1897), 271; *Report of CIA*, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1889–90, serial 2725 (Washington, D.C., 1890), 152.

45. Thomas Biolsi, *Organizing the Lakota: The Political Economy of the New Deal on Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservation* (Tucson, Ariz., 1992).

46. For a fascinating examination of Oglala political developments, see Akim D. Reinhardt’s, *Ruling Pine Ridge: Oglala Lakota Politics from the IRA to Wounded Knee* (Lubbock, Tex., 2007). For an insightful and powerful look into the social and political culture of Pine Ridge, see *The Spirit of Crazy Horse* by PBS Home Video (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1990).

47. The fact that some few full-bloods (most famously George Sword) adopted an Americanized economic worldview demonstrates that the full-blood-mixed-blood division was never quite a fixed equation.

48. Raymond J. De Mallie, “Pine Ridge Economy: Cultural and Historical Perspectives,” in *American Indian Economic Development* (The Hague, 1978), 237–312; Biolsi, “The Birth of the Reservation,” 28–53. De Mallie examined Pine Ridge economic evolutions and challenges from both a historical and a contemporary perspective. He notes the egalitarian nature and flexibility of pre-reservation Lakota

politics and their lack of contemporary unity (full-blood versus mixed-blood being just one division) as factors in the tribe’s economic difficulties. Robert E. Daniels examined cultural identity within Oglala contemporary culture. His work reveals the complexities inherent in the definition of the terms “full-blood” and “mixed-blood”—even for the Oglala themselves—within an economic framework of material culture, work, and cultural division. See Robert E. Daniels, “Cultural Identities among the Oglala Sioux,” in *The Modern Sioux: Social Systems and Reservation Culture*, ed. Ethel Nurge (Lincoln, Nebr., 1970), 198–245. Today, there are many meanings and associations tied to these divisive terms. My father, whose blood quanta is close to 67 percent and thus technically a “mixed-blood,” often refers to mixed-bloods in a derogatory fashion. Clearly, for him the terms “full-blood” and “mixed-blood” stretch beyond mere blood quantum categorization.

Ernest Hemingway’s West

1. Robert W. Trogdon, “Money and Marriage,” in *Hemingway: Eight Decades of Criticism*, ed. Linda Wagner-Martin (East Lansing, Mich., 2009), 338. The author would like to thank Kevin Kooistra of the Western Heritage Center in Billings, Sue Hart, and Lue Ponich for their help in researching this article.

2. Sean Hemingway, ed., *Hemingway on Hunting* (New York, 2001), xxvi.

3. Ernest Hemingway (hereafter EH) to Waldo Peirce, July 6, 1928, Ernest Hemingway Collection (hereafter Hemingway Coll.), John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts. Because unpublished Hemingway family letters may not be quoted directly, passages from such letters cited below have been paraphrased.

4. Carlos Baker, ed., *Ernest Hemingway: Selected Letters, 1917–1961* (New York, 1981), 282; Carlos Baker, *Ernest Hemingway: A Life Story* (New York, 1969), 196; Baker, *Selected Letters*, 285, 287. Reprinted with the permission of Scribner, a Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc., from *Ernest Hemingway, Selected Letters 1917–1961*, by Carlos Baker, editor. Copyright 1981 by Carlos Baker and The Ernest Hemingway Foundation, Inc. All rights reserved.

5. Baker, *Life Story*, 212.

6. *Ibid.*; Chub Weaver to Carlos Baker, Mar. 22, 1962, Carlos Baker Collection of Ernest Hemingway, 1800s–1987 (hereafter Baker Coll.), Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey; Sean Hemingway, *Hemingway on Hunting*, xvi.

7. Baker, *Life Story*, 212; Elsa Spear