Entry, Collusion, and Capacity Constraints
journal contributionposted on 15.11.2021, 21:30 authored by Charles F. Mason, C. Nowell
It is arguably true that no single topic has held more of a fascination for students of Industrial Organization than the issue of entry deterrence. This issue has been analyzed from many perspectives, including: role of advertising and imperfect information in deterring entry [1; 14; 18; 19]; incentives confronting a monopoly seller of durable goods [3; 4]; incentives in the context of sequential entry [2; 9]; dynamic aspects of entry deterrence [10; 13]; and the role of excess capacity in deterring entry [2; 23].
PublisherUniversity of Wyoming. Libraries
Journal titleSouthern Economic Journal
CollectionFaculty Publications - Economics
- Library Sciences - LIBS