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Entry, Collusion, and Capacity Constraints

journal contribution
posted on 01.04.1992, 00:00 by Charles F. Mason, C. Nowell
It is arguably true that no single topic has held more of a fascination for students of Industrial Organization than the issue of entry deterrence. This issue has been analyzed from many perspectives, including: role of advertising and imperfect information in deterring entry [1; 14; 18; 19]; incentives confronting a monopoly seller of durable goods [3; 4]; incentives in the context of sequential entry [2; 9]; dynamic aspects of entry deterrence [10; 13]; and the role of excess capacity in deterring entry [2; 23].

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ISO

eng

Language

English

Publisher

University of Wyoming. Libraries

Journal title

Southern Economic Journal

Collection

Faculty Publications - Economics

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